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THE THREAT IS REAL: PROTECTING THE ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE FROM CYBERATTACKS 
Patricia Blotzer* 
INTRODUCTION 
After the recent suspected hacking incidents including the Sony hack by North 
Korea in 2014, and more recently the 2016 Election hacks by Russia, both legislators 
and citizens are taking the threat and possibility of cyber threats to our nation’s en-
ergy infrastructures more seriously than ever. For many Americans, the realization 
that our nation’s election system may have been hacked is not only scary, but makes 
the possibility of hacking and cyber terrorism seem more possible than ever before.  
On November 24, 2014, Sony experienced a cyberattack that brought the com-
pany to its knees.1 As employees turned on their computers, they found the comput-
ers had been infected with malware displaying threats and “the menacing image of a 
fiery skeleton looming over the tiny zombified heads of the studio’s top two execu-
tives” on their screens.2 The malware spread from computer to computer throughout 
the company and across continents, erasing everything on 3,262 of 6,797 computers 
Sony owned, and deleting everything from 837 of 1,555 Sony servers.3 After erasing 
the data from the computers, the malware then deleted the startup software, making 
the computers useless.4 Then the hackers released the data they had stolen, including 
movie scripts, unreleased films, confidential emails, and over 47,000 social security 
numbers.5 It was speculated the hack was done to prevent Sony from releasing the 
movie The Interview.6 The cyberattack on Sony helped open America’s eyes to the 
fact that cyber threats are real, and can happen to anyone, including big corporations. 
 _________________________  
 * Barry University School of Law, Juris Doctor, May 2018; Webster University, Master of Health Admin-
istration, October 2011; University of Central Florida, B.A. Advertising/Public Relations, May 2003. First and fore-
most, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Nadia Ahmad, without her guidance this article 
would not be possible. I would also like to thank Professor Wes Henricksen, for his constant advice and support on 
my journey to being published.  
      1.  Peter Elkind, Sony Pictures: Inside the Hack of the Century, Part 1, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-1/?xid=for_em_sh, archived at https://perma.cc/E9XA-MJX7 [hereinafter 
Elkind, Sony, Part 1].  
 2. Id. Some experts remain unconvinced North Korea was behind the Sony cyberattacks. One reason is 
because it is easy and normal for hackers to leave false clues behind. The FBI concluded North Korea was behind 
the hacks after only 25 days, which many feel is too short a time to have fully conducted an investigation, and the 
FBI refuses to make the evidence that North Korea was responsible available to the public. See Peter Elkind, Sony 
Pictures: Inside the Hack of the Century, Part 3, FORTUNE (June 27, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://fortune.com/sony-hack-
final-part/, archived at https://perma.cc/D7DL-CWLY [hereinafter Elkind, Sony, Part 3].  
 3. Elkind, Sony, Part 1, supra note 1.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Elkind, Sony, Part 3, supra note 2. The Interview is a comedy where “Dave Skylark and his producer 
Aaron Rapoport run the celebrity tabloid show ‘Skylark Tonight’. When they land an interview with a surprise fan, 
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, they are recruited by the CIA to assassinate him.” The Interview, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2788710/?ref_=ttpl_pl_tt, archived at https://perma.cc/7YG2-9VSM. (last visited Aug. 
16, 2018).  
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After America’s eyes were opened by the Sony attacks, the 2016 Election hacks 
brought the threat of cyberattacks back to the forefront of people’s minds. In the 
declassified report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia 
was accused of hacking both Democratic and Republican targets, and using this in-
formation to “disrupt the American electoral process.”7 The report states, “Russia’s 
goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secre-
tary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency . . . . We further 
assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-
elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments.”8 The possibility of an-
other country having the capability to hack the election system has brought the topic 
of cyber security to the table for all industries, including energy, across the nation.  
Most people do not realize that hacking happens every day, and there have al-
ready been hacks to the energy infrastructures of the United States (U.S.) and other 
countries.9 While some hacks are done maliciously to cause harm, such as blackouts, 
other hacks are actually planned, and done to test the infrastructures and to locate 
potential weak points.10  
Cyberattacks are not only real, but they are already happening around the world. 
Part I of this note discusses cyberattacks that have occurred in the U.S. and other 
countries. Part II examines current legislation in the U.S. related to protecting the 
energy infrastructure from cyberattacks. Part III discusses the potential threats to, 
and examples of how each of four energy industries has been hacked. The four in-
dustries this note covers are: nuclear, hydro, solar, and wind.  
Part IV will review current and past proposed legislation in the U.S., and will 
discuss if these laws adequately protect our nation’s energy infrastructure from 
cyberattacks. In Part V, this note will consider how the energy industries and indi-
vidual power companies can take action on their own to protect themselves from 
cyberattacks. One way they can do this is by testing their own security systems, or 
hiring outside companies to hack into their systems to find weaknesses. The purpose 
of this note is to not only educate readers about the constant threat of cyberattacks 
on our nation’s energy infrastructures, but that there are things that can be done now 
to protect against cyberattacks, and that our legislators can help play a key role in 
protecting us going forward.  
 _________________________  
 7. Andy Greenberg, Feds’ Damning Report on Russian Election Hack Won’t Convince Skeptics, WIRED 
(Jan. 6, 2017, 5:25 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/feds-damning-report-russian-election-hack-wont-con-
vince-skeptics/, archived at https://perma.cc/2EQL-H74K. See also AJ Vicens, Russian Hackers May Now Be Muck-
ing With European Elections, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/poli-
tics/2017/02/what-russia-european-elections, archived at https://perma.cc/PLX7-G58E (after U.S. officials warned 
Russia may target other countries’ election systems, recent statements from Russia have led officials to believe 
Russia is now targeting France and Germany).  
 8. Greenberg, supra note 7.  
 9. Brian Naylor, Russia Hacked U.S. Power Grid – So What Will The Trump Administration Do About It?, 
NPR (Mar. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/23/596044821/russia-hacked-u-s-power-grid-so-
what-will-the-trump-administration-do-about-it, archived at https://perma.cc/8M4V-D72X. 
 10. Andy Greenberg, Hackers Gain Direct Access to US Power Grid Controls, WIRED (Sep. 06, 2017, 
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I. CYBERATTACKS TO ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURES ARE ALREADY HAPPENING 
A. Ukrainian Energy Hacks 
Ukraine fell victim to one of the first known cyberattacks on a civilian popula-
tion resulting in power outages in 2015.11 On December 23, one of Ukraine’s power 
distributors had 27 substations suddenly go dead, leaving 103 cities in the dark, and 
another 186 cities in partial darkness.12 Teams had to be sent around the region to 
manually flip the switches back on,13 restoring the power after six hours.14  
The cyberattack on Ukraine’s power grid started months earlier, when the energy 
company’s computers were infected with malware.15 It is believed someone at the 
company received and opened an infected Microsoft Word document, allowing the 
malware into the computer systems.16 When the power went out, the call centers for 
the power companies suddenly received thousands of calls from a remote adversary, 
with the purpose of “deny[ing] access to . . . customers calling in and reporting the 
outage.”17  
Almost a year later, on December 17, 2016, Ukraine’s power grid was hacked 
again.18 The second attack occurred around midnight and lasted only an hour.19 
Ukrainian officials believe the second attack was done by the same hackers who did 
the first.20 The second attack could have done more damage, but the hackers only 
seemed to want to make “a demonstration of [their] capabilities.”21 The second attack 
is believed to have begun in July during an immense phishing campaign that targeted 
many government offices, and once the hackers gained access, they watched and 
waited before making their presence known.22  
When a cyberattack is not discovered early on, the hacker can watch the system 
undetected for months.23 Once inside, hackers will often steal administrator creden-
tials, and conduct reconnaissance, watching network traffic and studying daily be-
haviors.24 “Ukraine ‘has turned into a training playground for research and develop-
ment of novel attack techniques’—attacks that will likely be used elsewhere once 
the hackers refine them.”25 One concern for the U.S. is, because our energy grid is 
 _________________________  
 11. Kim Zetter, The Ukrainian Power Grid Was Hacked Again, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 10, 2017, 10:07 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ukrainian-power-station-hacking-december-2016-report, archived at 
https://perma.cc/C8NY-W26X.  
 12. Jose Pagliery, Scary Questions in Ukraine Energy Grid Hack, CNN TECH (Jan. 18, 2016, 2:37 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/technology/ukraine-hack-russia/, archived at https://perma.cc/975L-VD3X 
[hereinafter Pagliery, Scary Questions].  
 13. Id.  
 14. Zetter, supra note 11. 
 15. Pagliery, Scary Questions, supra note 12.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Zetter, supra note 11.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. For an explanation of phishing, see infra Part V C.  
 23. Zetter, supra note 11.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
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more automated than in Ukraine, if we were to fall victim “to the same kind of attack 
as the one in Ukraine, manually flipping switches back ‘on’ won’t be as easy.”26  
B. Canadian Energy Hacks  
In November 2016, Canada’s federal intelligence agency, the Communication 
Security Establishment (CSE), released statistics of known “system compromises.”27 
The information released showed Canada’s natural-resources, energy, and environ-
ment sector was targeted by hackers almost as much as all other sectors combined.28 
This sector was targeted 2,078 times in 2016,29 whereas hacking attempts to all other 
sectors combined totaled 2,493.30 The Canadian government also reported that of the 
4,571 known compromises, information was stolen in only three instances, and in all 
three the information was not classified.31 One of these three instances was from the 
natural-resources, energy, and environment sector.32  
The CSE did not give specifics as to which specific departments were targeted 
by hackers, nor did they state the origin of the attacks.33 A CSE spokesman stated 
that “CSE will not provide details about ‘specific cyber threat actors or cyber security 
incidents,’ in order to protect the efficiency of classified cyber-defense methods that 
secure the government’s networks.”34 The CSE does block over 100 million at-
tempted hacks every day.35 
In December 2016, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warned 
Canada that an IP address at an Ontario electricity distributor, Hydro One, may have 
been the target of a Russian cyberattack.36 The U.S. government discovered the pos-
sible attack while investigating the 2016 Election hacks.37 This possible cyberattack 
involved Russian malware that may have been downloaded into computers at Hydro 
One.38 The company has stated that “they take cyber security seriously” and that “the 
address in question is not an active IP address at Hydro One, nor is it connected to 
the power system,” indicating the Canadian energy grid was not at risk.39  
 _________________________  
 26. Pagliery, Scary Questions, supra note 12.  
 27. Colin Freeze, Hackers Target Canadian Government’s Energy and Resource Departments, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/hackers-target-governments-en-
ergy-and-resource-departments/article32890960/, archived at https://perma.cc/9Z7L-RF6Y. See generally 
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT, https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/inside-interieur/protect-protection, 
archived at https://perma.cc/PNY6-ETDR (last visited Nov. 22, 2018) (the goal of Canada’s CSE is to safeguard 
and protect Canada’s computer networks with leading-edge technology). 
 28. Freeze, supra note 27.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.   
 31. Andrew Silver, Why Do Hackers Love to Attack Canada’s Energy Departments?, IEEE SPECTRUM (Dec. 
2, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/the-smarter-grid/why-do-hackers-love-to-attack-
canadas-energy-environment-and-natural-resources-sector, archived at https://perma.cc/T32F-XMFS.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Freeze, supra note 27.  
 34. Silver, supra note 31.  
 35. Id.   
 36. Exclusive: IP Address at Ontario Power Utility Linked to Alleged Russian Hacking, CTVNEWS (Jan. 3, 
2017, 6:28 PM), http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/exclusive-ip-address-at-ontario-power-utility-linked-to-alleged-
russian-hacking-1.3226290, archived at https://perma.cc/RVK4-ZK39 [hereinafter Exclusive]. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Exclusive, supra note 36.   
 39. Id.  
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C. U.S. Energy Hacks 
The U.S., like Canada, is somewhat silent on details involving hacks to the na-
tion’s energy infrastructures. In 2014, the energy grid was attacked 79 times, but the 
government would not provide specific information, simply stating the “incidents 
involved attacker techniques.”40 Vermont’s Burlington Electric recently found mal-
ware on a company owned laptop.41 Following the recommended procedures set out 
by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the company noti-
fied federal officials as soon as the malware was discovered, and an investigation on 
how the malware got on the laptop was initiated.42 The Vermont hack was described 
as “an example of the system working.”43 The electric company said the laptop was 
not connected to the grid, and officials are not sure if the intent of the cyberattack 
was to interrupt operations or to just test the system to determine if it was penetra-
ble.44 
In the past, China, Russia, and other countries have been suspected of attempting 
to hack into the nation’s utility companies.45 DHS released a report stating they be-
lieve Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) nations are targeting the U.S. primarily for 
conducting cyber espionage.46 APT actors successfully infiltrated the energy sector 
17 times during 2014, but did not cause any damage or disruptions to service.47 DHS 
reported, “the majority of malicious activity occurring against the energy sector is 
low-level cybercrime that is likely opportunistic in nature rather than specifically 
aimed at the sector, is financially or ideologically motivated, and is not meant to be 
destructive.”48  
While the report plays down the severity of these known hacks to our energy 
infrastructures, critics feel these cyberattacks should not be taken lightly.49 In one of 
the 17 known cyber hacks, the hackers are suspected of stealing data from a petro-
leum organization.50 DHS downplays the seriousness of these cyberattacks, claiming 
the hackers are only hacking into the energy systems to facilitate a disruption of 
 _________________________  
 40. Jose Pagliery, Government reveals details about energy grid hacks, CNN TECH (Apr. 5, 2016, 3:37 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/05/technology/energy-grid-hacks/, archived at https://perma.cc/P965-2YYH [here-
inafter Pagliery, Government reveals].  
 41. Juliet Eilperin & Adam Entous, Russian operation hacked a Vermont utility; showing risk to U.S. elec-
trical grid security, officials say, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/russian-hackers-penetrated-us-electricity-grid-through-a-utility-in-vermont/2016/12/30/8fc90cc4-ceec-
11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html?utm_term=.943e817cb123, archived at https://perma.cc/47Z8-YC2K.  
 42. Ellen Nakashimi & Juliette Eilperin, Russian government hackers do not appear to have targeted Ver-
mont utility, say people close to investigation, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackers-do-not-appear-to-have-targeted-vermont-utility-
say-people-close-to-investigation/2017/01/02/70c25956-d12c-11e6-945a-
76f69a399dd5_story.html?utm_term=.a423f01e03b1, archived at https://perma.cc/8U7U-ZH7X. For a discussion 
on NERC, see infra Part II B.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Eilperin & Entous, supra note 41.   
 45. Id.  
 46. Damaging Cyber Attacks Possible but Not Likely Against the US Energy Sector, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. 1, 1 (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2785293-DHS-27-1-2016-
Intelligence-Assessment.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8FB8-LR9E [hereinafter Damaging Cyber Attacks]. 
 47. Id. at 2.  
 48. Id.  
 49. See Pagliery, Government reveals, supra note 40.  
 50. Id.  
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services only in the event of hostilities between their nations and the U.S., and that 
a “cyberattack[] against the American energy sector is ‘possible but not likely.’”51  
Not all threats to the nation’s energy infrastructure are done by hackers. On Au-
gust 14, 2003, there was a major blackout affecting eight states in the Northeast, and 
part of Canada, leaving approximately 50 million people without power for two 
days.52 After a three-month investigation, conducted jointly by the U.S. and Canada, 
a report was released stating the blackout was caused by human error and equipment 
failures.53 The blackout occurred when the summer heat caused a powerline to sag 
and brush against some overgrown trees in Ohio, resulting in the powerline shutting 
down.54 This would normally set off an alarm at the utility company, but the alarm 
failed, and as system operators were working to figure out what had happened, three 
other lines also shut down, forcing other power lines to carry the extra burden of 
supplying power, which ultimately resulted in the lines shutting down, triggering 
failures throughout the U.S. and Canada.55 In the end, it was determined four main 
factors caused the blackout,56 and 46 recommendations were made to reduce the 
threat of future blackouts.57  
In 2017 the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI released an “amber” 
alert report to companies operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. warning against 
malware attacks aimed at the employees of nuclear companies.58 The report noted 
that no nuclear plants were in danger, and that the attempted hacks were focused on 
the personal computers of employees.59 This warning came after an earlier warning 
from DHS in 2017 about possible cyberattacks on the energy sector, as well as the 
healthcare industry, communications, and public health.60 While the reports and 
warnings indicate that the energy infrastructures of the U.S. have not been affected 
yet, it seems only a matter of time before hackers gain access.  
 _________________________  
 51. Id. 
 52. See James Barron, The Blackout of 2003: The Overview; Power Surge Blacks Out Northeast, Hitting 
Cities in 8 States and Canada; Midday Shutdowns Disrupt Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2003), http://www.ny-
times.com/2003/08/15/nyregion/blackout-2003-overview-power-surge-blacks-northeast-hitting-cities-8-
states.html, archived at https://perma.cc/A9RZ-MPHX ; J.R. Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout -- Five Years 
Later, SCI. AM. (Aug. 13, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2003-blackout-five-years-later/, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/82SW-R4A5.  
 53. Minkel, supra note 52.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2004), https://www.en-
ergy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/R5BX-
6DMU (the four causes of the blackout were: a “fail[ure] to assess and understand the inadequacies of [the] system,” 
“[i]nadequate situational awareness,” “fail[ure] to manage [] tree growth,” and “[f]ailure of the interconnected grid’s 
reliability organizations to provide effective real-time diagnostic support”). 
 57. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2006), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMe-
dia/BlackoutFinalImplementationReport%282%29.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2K3A-DWCE (final report dis-
cussing all forty-six recommendations made by the task force).  
 58. Sean Gallagher, FBI-DHS “amber” alert warns energy industry of attacks on nuke plant operators, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 6, 2017, 11:20 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/07/dhs-fbi-warn-of-at-
tempts-to-hack-nuclear-plants/, archived at https://perma.cc/E52M-ER7X.  
 59. Id.  
 60. See U. S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, ALERT (TA17-117A), INTRUSIONS AFFECTING 
MULTIPLE VICTIMS ACROSS MULTIPLE SECTORS (2017), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A, archived 
at https://perma.cc/3DGL-F6AQ.  
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II. CURRENT PROTECTIONS TO THE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Office of Energy In-
frastructure Security 
The only federal agency that can set standards governing cybersecurity for the 
electric utility industry is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).61 
FERC is composed of 12 offices, one being the Office of Energy Infrastructure Se-
curity (OEIS).62 OEIS “provides leadership, expertise and assistance to [FERC] to 
identify, communicate and seek comprehensive solutions to potential risks to FERC-
jurisdictional facilities from cyber attacks . . . .”63 OEIS is responsible for “formu-
lat[ing] and mak[ing] recommendations for [FERC] action and undertak[ing] collab-
orative engagement with other federal and state agencies and the energy industry to 
work to identify and communicate risks and vulnerabilities to this nation’s energy 
infrastructure . . . .”64 OEIS focuses on:  
Developing recommendations for identifying, communicating and mitigating 
potential cyber and physical security threats and vulnerabilities . . . ; Providing as-
sistance, expertise and advice to other federal and state agencies . . . in identifying, 
communicating and mitigating potential cyber and physical threats and vulnerabili-
ties . . . ; Participating in interagency and intelligence-related coordination and col-
laboration efforts with appropriate federal and state agencies and industry represent-
atives on cyber and physical security matters . . . ; Conducting outreach with private 
sector owners, users and operators of energy delivery systems regarding identifica-
tion, communication and mitigation of cyber and physical threats. . . .65  
B. North American Electric Reliability Corporation  
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a not-for-profit or-
ganization, founded in 1968 to develop and promote voluntary compliance with the 
rules for a reliable power grid in North America.66 The purpose of NERC is to ensure 
the power systems of North America remain reliable and secure.67 NERC is respon-
sible for developing and enforcing reliability standards; assessing and monitoring 
the energy systems; and educating, training, and certifying industry workers.68 The 
 _________________________  
 61. Susan J. Court, Federal Cyber-Security Law and Policy: The Role of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 437, 437 (2014).  
 62. About FERC, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp, archived at https://perma.cc/QA3W-DHSM 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2018).  
 63. Office of Energy Infrastructure Security (OEIS), FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/about/offices/oeis.asp, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/VD5C-DLLH (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. About NERC, NERC, https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx, archived at 
https://perma.cc/GL22-QE6G (last visited Aug. 16, 2018); FAQ, NERC, 
https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/exec/Pages/FAQ.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/8U4D-WGJQ (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2018).  
 67. About NERC, supra note 66; FAQ, supra note 66.   
 68. About NERC, supra note 66.  
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U.S., Canada, and parts of northern Mexico make up NERC’s area of coverage.69 
NERC is overseen by FERC as the electronic reliability organization for the U.S.70  
One department within NERC is the Electricity Information Sharing and Anal-
ysis Center (E-ISAC) which “establish[es] [] situational awareness, incident man-
agement, coordination, and communication capabilities within the [e]lectricity [s]ec-
tor . . . .”71 E-ISAC works with the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Electricity 
Subsector Coordinating Counsel to help the industry “prepare for and respond to 
cyber and physical threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents.”72 NERC has several com-
mittees to help achieve its objectives; one being the Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Committee (CIPC) which helps NERC improve the electricity infrastructure from 
cyberattacks.73  
C. Energy Policy Act 
After the blackout in the northeast in 2003,74 Congress enacted the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 (EPAct).75 Among other things, EPAct gives FERC the power “to es-
tablish a program to ensure the reliability of the U.S. ‘Bulk-Power System’ (i.e., the 
nation’s electric grid) by setting standards to apply to the users, owners, and opera-
tors of that system.”76 The EPAct increased the number of organizations subject to 
FERC’s jurisdiction from 200 to over 1,500.77 The Act also created hefty penalties 
for violating FERC’s standards, some as high as $1 million a day.78  
D. Code of Federal Regulations  
i. Protection of Digital Computer and Communications Systems  
A federal regulation covering the protection of digital computer and communi-
cation systems and networks, mandates energy providers protect all computer and 
communications systems and networks from cyberattacks.79 Providers must protect 
the systems from cyberattacks that could “[a]dversely impact the integrity or confi-
dentiality of data and/or software; [d]eny access to systems, services, and/or data; 
 _________________________  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Letter from Patricia Hoffman, Ass’t Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, to Gerry Cauley, President & CEO, N. 
Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., (Mar. 14, 2013) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Energy).  
 72. Electricity ISAC, NERC, http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Pages/default.aspx, archived at 
https://perma.cc/7YH8-2JEZ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).   
 73. For more information on the CIPC and the other committees of NERC, see Standing Committees and 
Other, NERC, http://www.nerc.com/comm/Pages/default.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/3SXA-8ZCR (last vis-
ited Aug. 16, 2018); Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC), NERC, 
https://www.nerc.com/comm/CIPC/Pages/default.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/K4PR-53T7 (last visited Dec. 
2, 2018).  
 74. See supra Part I C. 
 75. Court, supra note 61, at 437-38. To view the full act, see Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-
16524 (2012).  
 76. Court, supra note 61, at 438.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks, 10 C.F.R. § 73.54 (2018). 
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and [a]dversely impact the operation of systems, networks, and associated equip-
ment.”80 This shall be accomplished by analyzing and identifying what must be pro-
tected from cyberattacks by “[e]stablish[ing], implement[ing], and maintain[ing] a 
cyber security program,” and “[i]ncorporat[ing] the cyber security program.”81 The 
regulation requires a cyber security plan be developed and “must describe how the 
requirements . . . will be implemented . . .” and “must include measures for incident 
response and recovery for cyber attacks.”82 This security plan must describe how the 
energy provider will: “Maintain the capability for timely detection and response to 
cyber attacks; [m]itigate the consequences of cyber attacks; [c]orrect exploited vul-
nerabilities; and [r]estore affected systems, networks, and/or equipment affected by 
cyber attacks.”83  
ii. Networks and Cyber Security Event Notifications 
Another federal regulation, Networks and Cyber Security Event Notifications, 
sets requirements for what to do in the event of an actual or suspected cyberattack.84 
Upon the discovery of a cyberattack, the provider must call the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s Headquarters Operations Center, and then “submit a written security 
follow-up report . . . within 60 days of the []phone notification. . . .”85 The time for 
notification varies depending on the severity of the attack. Notification must be made 
within one hour after discovery if the attack had an adverse impact; within four hours 
if the attack could have had an adverse impact; and within eight hours after receiving 
information that someone may have been trying to gather information to conduct a 
cyberattack.86 The provider is also required to use their site corrective action plan 
within 24 hours of discovery to “record vulnerabilities, weaknesses, failures and de-
ficiencies in their [] cyber security program.”87  
III. CYBERSECURITY AND ENERGY INDUSTRIES 
A. Nuclear Power  
Of the four industries discussed in this note, nuclear power is perhaps the most 
protected from cyber threats. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the 
overseeing authority of the nuclear industry and is responsible for the creation of 
policies and regulations relating to the nuclear industry.88 After the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, the NRC ordered nuclear power plants to enhance security 
in multiple areas, including cybersecurity.89  
 _________________________  
 80. Id.   
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Cyber Security Event Notifications, 10 C.F.R. § 73.77 (2018). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. See UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OVERVIEW 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1616/ML16165A342.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/39W3-82PU.  
 89. Cyber Security for Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., (July 2016), https://www.nei.org/re-
sources/reports-briefs/cybersecurity-for-nuclear-power-plants archived at https://perma.cc/8H85-NMPB. 
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Nuclear power plants are protected from cyberattacks by layers of safety precau-
tions, with the first line of defense being isolation.90 What this means is that the 
“[c]ritical safety and security systems at nuclear energy facilities are isolated from 
the internet. They have no direct access to web, nor do they have indirect access 
because they are not connected to the plants’ internal networks.”91 Another layer of 
protection is NRC’s requirement that nuclear plants be designed to safely shut down 
and remain cooled if the systems detect any abnormalities on the electric grid.92 
Some steps nuclear power plants have taken to protect against cyber threats include: 
“[i]solat[ing] key control systems;” “[e]nhanc[ing] and implement[ing] strict con-
trols over the use of portable media and equipment;” and “[p]erform[ing] detailed 
cyber security assessments.”93 
Despite all of the layers of protection in the nuclear industry, it is still vulnerable 
to cyberattacks. In January 2003, the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Har-
bor, Ohio fell victim to one of the first cyberattacks of a nuclear power plant.94 The 
attack started when workers noticed the company’s network seemed to be running 
slow, or lagging, and by the afternoon malware had entered the systems used to con-
trol the nuclear reactor.95 The plant’s Safety Parameter Display System, which gives 
operators information about the state of the plant, shut off, and then the computers 
crashed.96 The reactor was offline at the time of the attack, and everything was re-
stored after a few hours.97  
One step the nuclear power industry can do to protect itself from cyberattacks is 
to assess the cyber threats and develop guidelines to measure these threats.98 Human 
factors in cybersecurity should also be addressed as the systems most likely to suc-
cumb to failure are the ones relying on human actions and interactions.99 Nuclear 
power plants should share information obtained from actual cyberattacks and at-
tempted ones, with nuclear plants in the U.S. and around the world.100 Another area 
that could be improved in the nuclear industry to protect against cyberattacks is with 
the communication between the nuclear technicians and information technology ex-
perts.101 Nuclear power plants also need to be able to track the integrity of their data, 
to ensure nothing has been “tampered with by a manufacturer, a consumer, a user, 
or a third-party developer.”102 
 _________________________  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Jason Deign, 7 Ways to cyber-secure a nuclear power plant, CISCO (Jul. 20, 2016), https://news-
room.cisco.com/feature-content?articleId=1774597&type=webcontent, archived at https://perma.cc/Z9RN-R5QK. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. The malware that infected Davis-Besse’s networks was a worm called SQL Slammer. After being 
dormant for a decade, SQL Slammer has recently made a comeback, re-entering into the news. See Ionut Arghire, 
SQL Slammer Worm Crawls Back, SEC. WEEK (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.securityweek.com/sql-slammer-worm-
crawls-back, archived at https://perma.cc/Z9RN-R5QK; Darren Pauli, Slammer work slithers back online to attack 
ancient SQL servers, THE REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 11:29 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/05/sql_slam-
mer_back/, archived at https://perma.cc/MP92-QERN. 
 98. Deign, supra note 94.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 
10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol24/iss1/3
Fall 2018 The Threat Is Real 49 
 
B. Hydropower  
In the hydropower industry, the hydro facilities are often located in the middle 
of nowhere, are generally unmanned, and require remote monitoring and control-
ling.103 Many of the computer systems controlling hydropower facilities are old and 
outdated and are often connected to office computers which are fairly easy to hack.104 
If someone were to gain access to a hydropower facility’s computers, they could 
potentially cause flooding.105  
In 2013, Iranian hackers successfully hacked into the control system of Bowman 
Avenue Dam near the village of Rye Brook, New York, located about 20 miles from 
New York City.106 While the specific details of this cyberattack are still classified, 
federal authorities discovered the attack while monitoring computers linked to pos-
sible Iranian hackers, and at first thought the cyberattack had occurred at another, 
much larger dam with a similar name.107 Officials, at first, thought the dam hacked 
was the Arthur R. Bowman Dam in Oregon, which is a 245-foot tall earthen dam, 
but the dam actually hacked was the Bowman Avenue Dam, which is a 20-foot tall 
concrete slab across Blind Brook, and was originally used for ice production.108 The 
hackers did not take control of the system, but only probed it, obtaining water level 
information and temperatures, but could have been able to open the floodgate re-
motely, if it had not been down for maintenance at the time of the incident.109 Be-
cause most of the hydropower industry’s control systems are similar to those at the 
Bowman Avenue Dam, this incident shows how vulnerable the hydropower industry 
is to cyberattacks.110 
C. Solar Power  
Similar to hydropower, federal authorities are generally tight lipped about the 
cybersecurity of solar power panels and facilities. The Manhattan Institute released 
a study in 2016, where they found “that making the power grid networked enough to 
handle the intermittent and unreliable nature of solar and wind power inherently 
makes it more vulnerable to cyberattacks.”111 The study also noted the amount of 
money the government spends on securing the nation’s energy infrastructures is triv-
ial compared to what the government spends on promoting green energy such as 
solar power.112  
 _________________________  
 103. Max Kutner, Alleged Dam Hacking Raises Fears of Cyber Threats to Infrastructure, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 
30, 2016, 8:12 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/cyber-attack-rye-dam-iran-441940, archived at 
https://perma.cc/9PG4-FP2U. 
 104. Danny Yadron, Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013; Cyberspies had Access to Control 
System of Small Structure Near Rye in 2013, Sparking Concerns that Reached to the White House, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 21, 2015, FACTIVA. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. (there are 31 dams in the U.S. with “Bowman” in the name).  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.; Kutner, supra note 103.  
 110. Kutner, supra note 103.  
 111. Andrew Follett, Security Expert: Solar Panels are Easy to Hack, THE DAILY CALLER (Aug. 2, 2016, 
4:14 PM) http://dailycaller.com/2016/08/02/security-expert-solar-panels-are-extremely-easy-to-hack/?pring=1, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/D64Q-3GG4. 
 112. Id.  
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One California citizen decided to test the security of his newly installed solar 
panels, and what he found was disturbing.113 He first found an open Wi-Fi access 
point coming from his solar provider’s Management Unit, and his computer was able 
to guess the username and password—”admin” and “support.”114 Once in the system, 
he could have made changes to the panels’ configuration and could have shut down 
the solar power system.115 He also found access to a virtual private network to all of 
the solar devices produced by one manufacturer, which would have allowed him to 
control anyone’s solar panels, and if these panels were connected to other home net-
works, he would have had access to those as well.116 This example proves what ex-
perts fear—solar panels can be easy to hack—giving hackers the ability to knock 
them offline; cause them to overheat, causing physical damage to the panels them-
selves; and allowing hackers to have access to personal home networks.117  
D. Wind Power  
Wind farms are considered to have some of the most current, sophisticated se-
curity methods in place to protect against cyberattacks.118 The power conversion 
equipment used in wind turbines “provides a buffer between the generator and the 
bulk power system that is absent in almost all other types of power plants,” making 
wind farms one of the most sophisticated in the energy industry.119 This power con-
version equipment used in the wind industry also protects from abnormal voltage 
and frequency deviations, providing an additional layer of protection against cyberat-
tacks.120 Because of the competitive nature of the wind industry, wind farm operators 
have financial motivators to ensure their plants are secure from competitors gaining 
access to commercially sensitive information, which also provides protection against 
cyberattacks.121 However, one possible flaw in the wind energy industry is wind tur-
bine “[s]oftware development information is publicly searchable and, technically, 
open to everyone”122  
Despite the wind industry being considered one of the most sophisticated in the 
energy industry, it has vulnerabilities. In March 2015, a German researcher found a 
vulnerability that could allow anyone to hack into several types of wind turbines, 
potentially giving hackers the power to shut the turbines down.123 One of the easiest 
 _________________________  
 113. Thomas Brewster, This Man Hacked His Own Solar Panels . . . And Claims 10,000 More Homes Vul-
nerable, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/08/01/1000-solar-
panels-tigo-vulnerable-hackers/, archived at https://perma.cc/M9HA-X3EB.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Follett, supra note 111.  
 118. Paul Dvorak, Cyber security and wind-farm penetrations, WIND POWER ENG’G (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://www.windpowerengineering.com/uncategorized/cyber-security-and-wind-farm-penetrations/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/V8SD-AQC4. 
 119. David Ward, Fact Check: Wind plant owners are leaders in cyber-security and grid reliability, INTO THE 
WIND: THE AWEA BLOG (Jul. 3, 2014), http://www.aweablog.org/fact-check-wind-plant-owners-are-leaders-in-
cyber-security-and-grid-reliability, archived at https://perma.cc/W3GP-58XV. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Dvorak, supra note 118. 
 123. See Thomas Brewster, Hundreds of Wind Turbines and Solar Systems Wide Open To Easy Exploits, 
FORBES (June 12, 2015, 12:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/06/12/hacking-wind-solar-
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ways hackers gain access to energy infrastructure systems, such as wind turbines, is 
by successfully guessing user login information and passwords. One report stated 
administrators often “use default, generic, and surprisingly easy passwords to pro-
tect” their systems, which makes accessing the system much easier for hackers trying 
to get in.124 
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
A. Proposed Bill: Grid Cybersecurity Research and Development Act 
The House of Representatives introduced a bill “to provide for a comprehensive 
interdisciplinary research and development initiative to strengthen the capacity of 
the electricity sector to neutralize cyber attacks” in October 2017.125 This Bill would 
help to identify risks in the nation’s energy sector, develop methods to detect cyber 
hackers, and develop technology to protect the energy sector from cyberattacks.126 
This Act would require the government to “work with manufacturers to build or ret-
rofit security features and protocols.”127  
Since being proposed in October 2017, it has been referred to several committees 
and subcommittees, the most recent being the subcommittee on Research and Tech-
nology in May 2018.128 The costs of this proposed Act begin with a cost of $65 mil-
lion the first year, increasing each year, to $79 million the fifth year.129  
B. Proposed Bill: Securing Energy Infrastructure Act  
In January 2017 a bill was introduced to the Senate and referred to the Commit-
tee on Energy and Natural Resources to establish “a pilot program to identify security 
vulnerabilities of certain entities in the energy sector.”130 If enacted, this Bill would 
require a two-year pilot program to be started within 180 days of the date of enact-
ment.131 The purpose of this program would be to “identify new classes of security 
vulnerabilities” within the energy sector, and “to isolate and defend industrial control 
systems of covered entities from security vulnerabilities.”132 One sponsor of this Bill 
calls it “a ‘retro’ approach” because it would revert some security devices on the grid 
 _________________________  
systems-is-easy/#50ff0e5d4d5c, archived at https://perma.cc/U5U6-57BR; Lorenzo Franceschi-Biccierai, Some 
Wind Turbines Can Be Hacked by Anyone With an Internet Connection, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 3, 2015, 8:30 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/some-wind-turbines-can-be-hacked-by-anyone-with-an-internet-con-
nection, archived at https://perma.cc/VB9P-P887. 
 124. Dvorak, supra note 118. 
 125. See Grid Cybersecurity Research and Development Act, H.R. 4120, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. STAFF OF COMM. ON SCI., SPACE, & TECH., 115TH CONG., BILL TRACKING REP. (Comm. Doc. 2018). 
 129. H.R. 4120.  
 130. Securing Energy Infrastructure Act, S. 79, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 131. Id.   
 132. Id.  
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back “to analog and human-operated systems instead of connecting them to comput-
ers.”133 The funds authorized for the completion of the pilot program are $10 mil-
lion.134  
The Bill would also establish a working group “to evaluate the technology plat-
forms and standards used in the [pilot] [p]rogram” and “to develop a national cyber-
informed engineering strategy to isolate and defend covered entities from security 
vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of the covered entities.”135 
The Secretary of Energy (Secretary) will appoint the members of the working group, 
which will consist of no fewer than ten members.136 These members will come from 
the DOE, the energy industry, and the DHS, among others.137  
Within two years of the first disbursement of funds, the Secretary will submit a 
final report on the pilot program to Congress that will: “describe[] the results of the 
Program; include[] an analysis of the feasibility of each method studied under the 
Program; and describe[] the results of the evaluation conducted by the working 
group.”138 The funds authorized for the working group and final report are $1.5 mil-
lion.139 Senator Angus King, who introduced the bill to the Senate, said, “I don’t 
know how many warnings we have to get before something catastrophic happens. 
That’s why I introduced this bill . . . that [it] is a bipartisan bill aimed at trying to 
determine what some of the ways are to protect the grid.”140 
C. Proposed Resolution: Establishing the Select Committee on Cybersecu-
rity 
A resolution was introduced to the Senate in January 2017 requesting the estab-
lishment of the Select Committee on Cybersecurity.141 One of the resolution’s spon-
sors, Senator Cory Gardner, said, “Cybersecurity policy is one of the most complex 
and significant challenges facing Congress, yet the Senate’s structure to investigate 
and address cyber issues is diffuse and inadequate. This has led to an uncoordinated 
policy response to recent cyberattacks on government agencies, businesses, and in-
frastructure.”142 This proposed committee would be composed of 21 members, be 
responsible for overseeing and holding continuing studies on cybersecurity threats, 
and to make recommendations regarding these threats.143 “All proposed legislation, 
messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the following” must be 
 _________________________  
 133. Jacqueline Toth, Grid Cybersecurity Measure Would Examine Benefits of Analog Systems, CQ ROLL 
CALL, Jan. 11, 2017, 2017 WL 103845.  
 134. S. 79. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Jeremy Dillon, As Grid Cybersecurity Fears Grow, Senate Measure Eyes Broad Approach, CQ ROLL 
CALL, Jan. 30, 2017, 2017 WL 393335. 
 141. Establishing the Select Committee on Cybersecurity, S. Res. 23, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 142. Dillon, supra note 140.  
 143. For a list of the 21 committee members, see S. Res. 23.  
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referred to the Select Committee on Cybersecurity: “[d]omestic and foreign cyber-
security risks,” and the “[a]uthorizations for appropriations . . . for preventing, pro-
tecting against, or responding to cybersecurity threats to the United States.”144  
The committee will be authorized to make investigations, hold hearings, sub-
poena witnesses, take depositions, hire consultants, and make recommendations on 
matters within its jurisdiction.145 The committee shall be able to obtain necessary 
information related to cybersecurity threats to ensure they have complete and up to 
date information.146 Annual reports on cyber threats will be provided to the commit-
tee from the Directors of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
retary of State.147 
D. Failed Proposal: Amendment to the Federal Power Act 
If previous attempts to protect the nation’s energy infrastructure are an indicator 
of the success or failure of the currently proposed bill and resolution, then the future 
of these proposals is bleak. In April 2015, a bill was proposed “to protect the bulk-
power system from cyber security threats.”148 This Bill had recommended adding a 
section covering cybersecurity threats to the Federal Power Act.149 This amendment 
would have allowed the Secretary—with written notice from the President “that im-
mediate action is necessary to protect the bulk-power system from a cyber security 
threat,”—to require “any entity that owns, controls, or operates a bulk-power system 
facility to take such actions as the Secretary determines will best avert or mitigate 
the cyber security threat.”150 The Secretary would also have been encouraged to con-
sult with officials in Canada and Mexico to protect the electricity grid from cyber 
threats.151 Congress adjourned before this bill passed any of the committees, and 
therefore this proposed amendment to the Federal Power Act failed.152  
E. Failed Proposal: Grid Cybersecurity Research and Development Act 
In September 2016, another bill, the Grid Cybersecurity Research and Develop-
ment Act, was proposed to the House of Representatives to “provide for a compre-
hensive interdisciplinary research and development initiative to strengthen the ca-
pacity of the electricity sector to neutralize cyber attacks.”153 In this proposed Act, 
the Secretary would have carried out a “research, development, and demonstration 
initiative to harden and mitigate the electric grid from the consequences of cyber 
 _________________________  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. S. 1068, 114th Cong. § 224 (2015).  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. S. 1068 (114th): A bill to amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system from cyber 
security threats, GOVTRACK (last visited Nov. 14, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/bills/114/s1068 [hereinafter GOVTRACK, S. 1068]. 
 153. Grid Cybersecurity and Research and Development Act, H.R. 6227, 114th Cong. (2016).  
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attacks by increasing the cyber security capabilities of the electricity sector and ac-
celerating the development of cybersecurity technologies and tools.”154  
The Secretary would have been responsible for, among other things, “iden-
tify[ing] cybersecurity risks to the communication and control systems,” “de-
velop[ing] methods and tools to rapidly detect cyber intruders,” and “develop[ing] 
secure industrial control system protocols.”155 The Secretary would have also been 
responsible for updating several cybersecurity publications, and for “develop[ing] 
voluntary guidance to improve forensic analyses capabilities, including developing 
standardized terminology and monitoring processes; identifying minimum data 
needed; and utilizing human factors research to develop more effective procedures 
for logging incident events . . . .”156 Under this Act, the Secretary would have worked 
with the private owners and operators of the energy sector to conduct “voluntary 
vulnerability testing and red team-blue team exercises, to identify vulnerabilities in 
physical and cyber systems; [and to] develop cybersecurity risk assessment tools and 
provide confidential analyses and recommendations.”157 This act would have devel-
oped both “assessment methods and tools to identify existing personnel that show 
competence in [] core skills,” and “cybersecurity training and retraining standards, 
lessons, and recommendations for the electricity sector that minimize duplication of 
cybersecurity compliance training programs.”158 
The Secretary would have been required to collaborate with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, other Federal agencies, and the energy sector to “conduct a 
study to analyze cyberattacks on electricity sector industrial control systems and 
identify cost-effective opportunities to improve cybersecurity.”159 Like the proposed 
amendment to the Federal Power Act, Congress adjourned before this Bill passed 
any of its assigned committees, and therefore the Grid Cybersecurity Research and 
Development Act failed. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Does the Current and Proposed Legislation Go Far Enough? 
Given the successful hacking attempts to the nation’s energy infrastructure 
across several industries, it is apparent that current legislation does not go far enough 
in protecting against cyberattacks.160 Both the proposed amendment to the Federal 
Power Act in 2015, and the Grid Cybersecurity Research and Development Act of 
 _________________________  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. For an explanation on Red team-blue team exercises, see infra Part V C. See also Pierluigi Paganini, 
Cyber Security: Red Team, Blue Team and Purple Team, SEC. AFFAIRS (Jul. 23, 2016) http://securityaffairs.co/word-
press/49624/hacking/cyber-red-team-blue-team.html., archived at https://perma.cc/T8LK-XMKC. See also Tech 
Insider, Watch Hackers Break into the US Power Grid, YOUTUBE (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pL9q2lOZ1Fw, archived at https://perma.cc/RY69-EXRX (a group known as 
Red Team Security, hired by a power company, successfully hacks into the power company’s systems).  
 158. H.R. 6227. 
 159. Id.  
 160. See supra Part III A, B, and C.  
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2016 failed after being sent to committees for review.161 This is where most proposed 
bills and amendments die. For a proposed piece of legislation to become law, it must 
pass both houses and have approval from the President.162 Once a bill or amendment 
has been introduced to the house or senate, it is then sent to committees to be voted 
on, but unfortunately many bills die before voting because many bills are often ig-
nored by their assigned committees.163  
One problem with the Grid Cybersecurity Research and Development Act is that 
it was simply a research proposal, which would take private sector energy operators 
and allow them to voluntarily participate. The information gathered from this re-
search study would not have involved all operators and therefore could have lacked 
vital information when conducting the study.164 In a study set up this way, some 
sectors, such as the wind industry, may not have had a lot of participation since this 
industry tends to keep information secret from competitors.  
One possible issue with the pilot program proposed in January 2017, is that it 
involves a two-year pilot program to identify security vulnerabilities in the energy 
industry, however, cyberattacks are constantly evolving—as technology advances, 
so do the techniques of hackers. Because it takes so long to enact laws and regula-
tions, by the time the study is completed, and recommendations are considered and 
enacted, the entire cyber community could completely change, making anything dis-
covered during the pilot program obsolete.  
The establishment of a Select Committee on Cybersecurity may be able to pass 
both houses. Having a committee specifically designated to handle cybersecurity 
threats and issues could be beneficial to protect from cyberattacks. The committee 
would need to consist of people with knowledge in the energy industry, as well as in 
cybersecurity, and hacking. Giving this committee the ability to gather the infor-
mation needed to make the most accurate and reliable recommendations possible 
will be crucial for its success. Requiring an annual report would hold the committee 
responsible, however, it may be good to also require them to release individual re-
ports on known cyberattacks within a certain time frame, in addition to the annual 
report.  
B. Other Options  
Instead of establishing a Select Committee on Cybersecurity, however, Congress 
could use NERC’s CIPC. This committee has several subcommittees, task forces, 
and work groups already dedicated to protecting the infrastructure from cyberat-
tacks.165 By utilizing an already existing committee, the government could poten-
tially save money and gain valuable knowledge from an already established group. 
 _________________________  
 161. See GOVTRACK, S. 1068, supra note 152; H.R. 6227 (114th): Grid Cybersecurity Research and Devel-
opment Act, GOVTRACK (last visited Nov. 14, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr6227 
archived at https://perma.cc/W7TZ-H962. 
 162. See Why Do so Few Bills Become Law?, REFERENCE, https://www.reference.com/government-poli-
tics/bills-become-laws-d071997480e11fee (last visited Aug. 16, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/9URF-3CNZ . 
 163. Id.  
 164. See generally H.R. 6227 (the only required members are members from Federal agencies). 
 165. For more information on the 20 subcommittees, task forces, and work groups under the CIPC, see Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC), NERC, http://www.nerc.com/comm/CIPC/Pages/default.aspx, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/L42F-4JGF (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).  
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The government should also establish federal regulations covering the education and 
training of industry workers using the CIPC’s structure. The five key methods the 
CIPC uses to educate and train industry workers are: “[p]rotecting,” “[d]eterring,” 
“[p]reventing,” “[l]imiting,” and “[r]ecovering.”166 
C. Industries Can Take Action 
While waiting for the government to enact better protections against cyberat-
tacks for the nation’s energy infrastructures, there are some things industries can do 
to protect themselves now. These include: sending out phishing test emails, conduct-
ing employee training, and hiring companies to hack into their own systems.  
Phishing occurs when a hacker sends out an email that appears to be from a 
business or employer with the intention of tricking the recipient into giving out their 
personal or login information.167 An estimated 156 million phishing emails are sent 
out daily, with 80,000 people falling victim to them.168 Companies can protect them-
selves by sending out their own phishing test emails. To do this, companies would 
need to send out a phishing email to all employees, and then document which em-
ployees clicked the link provided, or opened the document attached.169 For the best 
results, information about the company induced phishing attack should be shared 
with all employees, providing information on how many failed versus how many 
passed the phishing test, and explaining the damages that could have occurred from 
those who fell victim to the fake attack.170  
Training employees to spot phishing attempts is one way to prevent cyberattacks 
since many hackers gain access by phishing.171 Other methods to protect from 
cyberattacks include requiring employees to use strong, unique passwords that can-
not be easily guessed.172 The “see something, say something” motto the country has 
adopted in its battle against terrorism, can also be used to protect companies from 
cyberattacks. If an employee finds or suspects a problem, or if they feel they may 
have clicked something that could have been a phishing attempt or downloaded a 
suspicious file, they should be trained to report it right away. This could help detect 
an attack as soon as it happens, making it easier to stop before the hacker gains much, 
if any information.173 
Perhaps the best way an energy company can protect itself from cyberattacks, is 
by hiring a company to hack into its systems. This is often called red team-blue team 
 _________________________  
 166. Id.  
 167. Phishing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0003-phishing , archived at 
https://perma.cc/VSR7-QXBN (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). To see an example of what a phishing email might look 
like, see Protect yourself from phishing, MICROSOFT,  https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4033787/windows-
protect-yourself-from-phishing, archived at  https://perma.cc/R8CG-7V54 (last visited Nov. 25, 2018). 
 168. Austin Whipple, If You’re Not Phishing Your Employees, You Should Be: Here’s How, BETTER CLOUD 
MONITOR (June 9, 2016), https://www.bettercloud.com/monitor/internal-phishing-training/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/9PXU-U2CL.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Juan Martinez, 6 Ways to Train Your Employees to Prevent Cyberattacks, PC MAG (Oct. 21, 2016, 4:20 
PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article/348925/6-ways-to-train-your-employees-to-prevent-cyberattacks, archived at 
https://perma.cc/75G4-PDMT. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
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exercises and was one of the testing methods recommended in the 2016 proposed 
comprehensive interdisciplinary research and development initiative to protect 
against cyberattacks to the energy sector.174 Red team-blue team exercises come 
from military jargon, and are basically composed of a group of professionals (the red 
team), which does everything they can to attack the energy company (the blue team), 
while the energy company tries to defend themselves.175  
CONCLUSION 
With the world’s eyes suddenly opened to the reality of cyberattacks, many peo-
ple are now concerned about, and focusing on ensuring the energy infrastructures of 
the U.S. are secure. Hackers attempt to penetrate the system every day, it can take 
months to learn someone has gained access, and once inside, they can do insurmount-
able damage. While the potential damage that can be done varies by industry—nu-
clear melt down, flooding, home network hacking, simply turning the lights off—
the methods of gaining access are very similar.  
These scary realities are just one reason why our current legislation should push 
to ensure we enact more laws to better protect the energy infrastructures. The current 
protections are a step in the right direction, but more is needed. The proposed Select 
Committee on Cybersecurity would be one step in the right direction, as it would 
create a committee solely designated to investigating cyberattacks to the energy grid, 
but this does not go far enough to protect our energy infrastructures from cyberat-
tacks.  
One weakness in each of the four sectors covered in this note, was the potential 
for malware to enter into computer systems. Once hackers gain access to the system, 
they often sit quietly, monitoring the daily operations until they are ready to strike. 
This ability to essentially spy on an energy provider for months, without ever being 
detected, makes the need for better cybersecurity regulations even more crucial. 
Hackers are trying to gain access to the energy grid on a daily basis, and as one 
hacker for a red team security group said, “We will get in, there’s no doubt about 
it,”176 it is simply a matter of time. 
 
 _________________________  
 174. See supra Part IV E. 
 175. Doug Drinkwater & Kacy Zurkus, Red team versus blue team: How to run an effective simulation, CSO 
(Jul. 26, 2017, 4:03 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2122440/disaster-recovery/emergency-preparedness-
red-team-versus-blue-team-how-to-run-an-effective-simulation.html, archived at https://perma.cc/CWQ7-ZZHA. 
To watch a video of a Red Team Security group successfully break into the energy grid, see Tech Insider, supra 
note 157.  
 176. Tech Insider, supra note 157.  
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